We develop a model for contagion in reinsurance networks by which primary insurers' losses are spread through the network. Our model handles general reinsurance contracts, such as typical excess of loss contracts. We show that simpler models existing in the literature-namely proportional reinsurance-greatly underestimate contagion risk. We characterize the fixed points of our model and develop efficient algorithms to compute contagion with guarantees on convergence and speed under conditions on network structure. We characterize exotic cases of problematic graph structure and nonlinearities, which cause network effects to dominate the overall payments in the system. We lastly apply our model to data on real world reinsurance networks. Our simulations demonstrate the following:
Introduction
The London market excess of loss (LMX) spirals of the 1980-90s revealed how global interconnections among reinsurers (i.e., insurers who insure other insurers) can cause contagion in the reinsurance market [Bain 1999 ]. This resulted in high concentration of losses despite the belief that all parties were properly insured. A series of major storms in these years caused tail losses to
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Figure 1: Diagram of LMX reinsurance spirals.
the London insurance market (and Lloyd's in particular) . While risks in the London market were reinsured outside the UK, retrocession (i.e., reinsurance on reinsurance) brought these losses back to the London market, resulting in unexpected concentration of losses. Figure 1 visualizes these interconnections.
After these events, the industry mitigated such spiral risks by reducing the size of the retrocession market. Today, there is a sense in the insurance industry that the risk of spirals is largely a thing of the past and that risks are properly shared with reinsurers. To our knowledge, no reinsurance risk models used in the industry directly account for these sort of network effects. By applying the machinery we develop in this paper to estimates of the current US reinsurance system, we show that the reinsurance market is, in fact, not safe to network effects. We show such network effects can dominate the tail behavior of the system in ways that are difficult to predict. We propose a model for contagion in reinsurance markets by which primary insurers' losses are spread throughout the network. Despite a vast literature on contagion in financial networks (see e.g., [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] , [Acemoglu et al. 2015] , [Elliott et al. 2014] ), no existing contagion models are general enough to cover reinsurance contracts. The majority of financial network models are limited to simple contexts in which network interactions are representable by debt or equity contracts between entities. Very little work has extended these models to more complicated derivatives whose payoffs in equilibrium depend on the liabilities and counterparty risk across the network. As a notable exception, [Schuldenzucker et al. 2016] demonstrates difficulties in clearing networks with credit default swaps in addition to initial debt contracts. Reinsurance contracts differ from debt contracts in that we don't outright know their liabilities. Reinsurance contracts differ from credit default swaps in that contract liabilities aren't related to default events. Instead, the liabilities of reinsurance contracts are interrelated and nonlinear, which can lead to difficulties in determining equilibrium payoffs and to multiple solutions. Our model ventures far beyond the settings and results of [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] and [Acemoglu et al. 2015] as it, in general, requires working with matrices with arbitrarily large column sums as opposed to column sums ≤ 1. [Blanchet et al. 2015] developed one of the first network models for reinsurance contagion; however, they assume that reinsurance contracts are proportional contracts as opposed to the more common excess of loss contracts (we provide more background on these types of contracts in the next section) and that reinsurance contracts don't cover liabilities from other reinsurance contracts, which limits the propagation of losses to two steps in the network. These assumptions remove exotic behavior from the system, such as reinsurance spirals, which we show can play a critical role. Under these assumptions, they provide large deviation results for the loss in the system. In contrast, we focus on a more general setting that handles a wide variety of reinsurance contracts that exist in the real world, including the more common excess of loss contracts. Our simulations comparing excess of loss networks with proportional networks further show that this assumption in [Blanchet et al. 2015 ] dangerously underestimates contagion risk in real reinsurance networks.
[ Kley et al. 2016] develop a bipartite graph model of tail risk in insurance. However, their model does not include reinsurance. [Feinstein et al. 2017 ] describes the sensitivity of payment equilibria in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] to small variations in the interbank liabilities. In contrast, our focus is on the reinsurance model that produces these liabilities. Further, we show that these liabilities can have wild variations from small uncertainties in network parameters.
In addition to developing a contagion model for reinsurance networks, our contributions include the following:
• We establish efficient algorithms to compute contagion with guarantees on convergence and speed under conditions on network structure.
• We characterize exotic cases of problematic graph structure and nonlinearities, which cause network effects that dominate the overall payments in the system. We relate reinsurance spirals to structural properties of the network, such as the existence of graph cycles that recirculate large proportions of reinsurance losses. Further, we show that these cycles can be very complicated interactions of simple graph cycles.
• We apply our model to real world reinsurance networks using data provided by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Our simulations show that, using real world data, nonlinearities in contagion can cause extreme uncertainties. We demonstrate that even if a firm has unreasonably precise information 1 (i.e., with small uncertainty) about the global structure of the system, it can still be wildly uncertain about the losses it will face from a given shock. We further demonstrate that these nonlinearities can cause excess costs in a real world system-i.e., the insurance-reinsurance system could be structured differently to perform its function to protect real world infrastructure more efficiently.
We conclude by introducing three promising starting points for solving real world issues that our results reveal: using distributed systems to control fraud, using network features to predict risk exposure, and designing markets to lower systemic costs.
Reinsurance Contagion Model

Brief primer on reinsurance contracts
Reinsurance contracts are insurance contracts that insurance companies take out to protect against large losses on their insurance portfolios. In primary reinsurance, the insurance company protected by the reinsurance is a primary insurance company. In retrocession reinsurance, the insurance company protected by the reinsurance is another reinsurance company. These reinsurance contracts are typically partly collateralized, meaning that, in the event that the reinsurer defaults on their obligations, the reinsured firm still has recourse to the collateral. Most reinsurance contracts in property and casualty are treaty contracts, which insure against losses from the reinsured company's entire insurance portfolio. Alternatively, in a niche case that we won't consider, some contracts have more specialized coverage of facultative risks.
The most common form of treaty reinsurance is an excess of loss (XL) contract, in which the reinsurer covers losses on the reinsured above a deductible (also known as an attachment point).
These contracts also commonly have caps (also known as limits) on the payouts of the contract. The total coverage of a firm is typically split into multiple deductible-cap layers in a tranche structure.
Multiple reinsurers typically split each layer, taking fractions of the coverage. Together, the layers form a tower.
Another form of treaty reinsurance is a proportional contract. In this case there are no deductibles or caps, and the reinsurer takes on a percentage of the liabilities of the reinsured according to a coinsurance rate.
Two contagion mechanisms
Reinsurance contracts between a set of insurance companies form a network. Exogenous liabilities to a subset of primary insurers constitutes a shock to this network. This shock may activate reinsurance to the primary insurers, which can in turn activate a cascade of retrocession reinsurance.
Figure 2a outlines this liability propagation mechanism. The equilibrium of this process gives a network of liabilities between firms. Given their available capital, some firms may be unable to pay these liabilities. These firms default, potentially with extra default costs representing the legal, transactional, and liquidity costs of default. Each default negatively affects the capital of neighboring firms as these firms receive less on the liabilities they are owed. This can trigger Given a shock, we aim to determine the equilibrium reinsurance payments from a complex interconnection of contracts. Unlike the case of a debt network in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] , we don't outright know the liabilities of each contract, so we can't directly calculate a clearing payment vector. In a reinsurance network, the liabilities are interrelated and nonlinear. The difficult problem in this case is to determine the equilibrium liabilities given a shock, after which we can solve for a clearing payment vector as in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] . The process for calculating contagion is then as follows:
1. Given a primary insurance shock, calculate the equilibrium reinsurance liabilities.
2. Apply the available collateral from reinsurance contracts to fulfill or partially fulfill liabilities.
3. Given the remaining capital of firms, clear the remaining liabilities in the network.
We proceed in this paper by developing the machinery to handle the missing piece of the puzzle: the first step. This problem is much more general than related problems formulated in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] and [Acemoglu et al. 2015] and involve matrices with column sums > 1.
Network definitions
We define the reinsurance network as follows:
• n nodes of primary insurance and reinsurance firms
• m edges represent reinsurance contracts between firms, directed from reinsurer to reinsured firm. Edges are described by the following weight matrices
• Γ n × n matrix of coinsurance rates on contracts (0 if no contract between parties)
• DD n × n matrix of deductibles (also called 'attachment points') on reinsurance contracts (0 if no contract between parties)
• CP n × n matrix of reinsurance caps (also called 'limits') on contracts (0 if no contract between parties). This is the maximum payout of the contract
• sh vector representing shocks to primary insurers.
• e 0 vector representing initial capital (also called 'equity') values of each firm available to payout liabilities
We assume the graph is connected, as we can otherwise handle the components separately. We also assume that firms can only reinsure up to 100%: i.e., the column sums of Γ corresponding to a particular layer of reinsurance sum to ≤ 1. This is a reasonable assumption as otherwise the contract ceases to serve as insurance and the insured company stands to profit from taking on large losses to their portfolio. This assumption is a standard requirement in insurance contracts.
We will work with the line graph of the network, i.e., the graph that represents edges of the original graph as nodes in the new network and has directed edges when the head of an edge in the original network intersects the tail of another edge in the original network. We define the line graph network as follows:
• m nodes representing contracts (i.e., edges) in the reinsurance network
• X adjacency matrix of the line graph, 1-0 weighted
• liability vector on contracts
• d deductibles vector on contracts
• c caps vector on contracts
• s shock vector on contracts
• γ diagonal matrix of reinsurance rates on contracts
The line graph network serves to consider the system as a network of contracts instead of a network of firms. We define a financial system in terms of its line graph network (X, γ, d, c, s) (sometimes omitting the c if we are in the domain of infinite caps) as that is the machinery we will need in our theorems and algorithms; however, it can equivalently be defined in terms of the adjacency graphs of the reinsurance network (Γ, DD, CP, sh). Note that since γX is nonnegative, the PerronFrobenius theorem gives us that the spectral radius ρ(γX) = λ max (γX). We will show in the next section how to calculate the resulting equilibrium liabilities matrix L (or equivalently liabilities vector in the line graph network) giving liability weights on contracts in a financial system.
Network Liabilities
Liabilities without contract caps
In the case that each contract has a deductible but no cap (equivalently, each contract has an infinite cap, and so there is no layering of reinsurance), liabilities on contracts equal the sum of direct shocks -deductibles + cross-effects from the network, multiplied by γ and with a floor at zero. I.e., the equilibrium liabilities is a fixed point to the equation
This is equivalent to
where B( ) is the diagonal matrix with 1-0 entries indicating which contracts are activated (i.e., have surpassed the deductible) under . Specifically, B( ) ii = 1 if (X + s − d) i ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. We define a B-constant set to be the subset of the domain such that B is a given constant value-i.e., the pre-image of a particular B.
Note that this Φ is nonnegative, monotone increasing (i.e, nondecreasing), and convex as it is the composition of an increasing affine function and a nonnegative, increasing convex function (pointwise maximum). This instance of the problem is similar to the problem considered in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] but without a general upper bound. We solve it in similar ways but provide more direct proofs.
Liabilities with contract caps
In the more general case in which each contract has a deductible and a cap (possibly infinite), there can be multiple layers of reinsurance. Adding the capping effect to the setup started above, the liabilities vector is a fixed point to the equation
where
• C( ) is the diagonal matrix with 1-0 entries indicating which edges have surpassed their caps (and so no longer activated); specifically, C( ) ii = 1 if γ(X + s − d) ii ≥ c ii and 0 otherwise,
• Ψ is a map to a system on the zero diagonal coordinates of C( ),
We define a (B, C)-constant set to be the subset of the domain such that both B and C are
given constant values-i.e., the intersection of the pre-image of a particular B and the pre-image of a particular C.
Unlike the simpler Φ without contract caps, which is a subcase of the more general setting, the Φ with contract caps is not generally convex. It remains monotone increasing, however. This problem is similar to the problem considered in [Acemoglu et al. 2015] ; however, their methodology is limited to the case in which matrix column sums are ≤ 1. In the general case of reinsurance layering, column sums can be arbitrarily high. We develop machinery to handle this much more general setting.
Unless specifically pointed out, we will work with the general form of Φ with contract caps.
Unique fixed point
We characterize conditions under which a unique fixed point exists in Theorem 1. To construct the proof, we will need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. A linear system with matrix A is a contraction with respect to some norm if and only if the spectral radius ρ(A) < 1. Further, this norm · s can be taken to be a weighted Euclidean norm of the form y s = M y 2 , where M is a square invertible matrix.
A proof of Lemma 1 can be seen in, for example, Appendix B of [Bertsekas 2013] Lemma 2. (B, C)-constant sets are convex and form a finite partition of the space { | ≥ 0}.
Proof. For every ≥ 0, there is a unique corresponding B and C defined (and so also a unique Ψ). Note that on the boundary between (B, C)-constant sets multiple Bs and Cs could be defined equivalently. This is because Φ is an intersection of linear systems on the boundaries-the difference in possible Bs and Cs comes from edges that have exactly met their deductible or cap respectively but have no excess liability under . In these cases, B ii or C ii respectively can be set equivalently to 1 or 0, but a unique selection is defined in the definition.
The derivatives of B( ) and C( ) are defined and zero except at points of discontinuity since B and C only change at thresholds. B and C are defined such that their value on the boundary (i.e., at points of non-differentiability in either B or C) are constant with a value on one side of the boundary. As there are 2 m possible B and C matrices (1 or 0 for each diagonal entry), the (B, C)-constant sets form a finite partition of { | ≥ 0} of size at most 2 2 m .
To establish convexity, notice that systems of linear inequalities define B and C. And so the (B, C)-constant sets, each the intersection of the pre-image of a given B and C values, are convex sets since they are the intersections of half-spaces from each inequality.
We now define the terms used in the theorem:
• Let K(X, γ, d, c, s) be the set of (B, C) pairs such that the (B, C)-constant set is nonempty.
I.e., for (B, C) ∈ K, there is a feasible such that B( ) = B and C( ) = C. For example, there is no feasible such that B( ) = 0 and C( ) = I as the activation of all caps means that all deductibles must also be met. As another example, contracts in different layers reinsuring the same firm cannot simultaneously be activated: we only reach the second layer if the first layer has reached its cap. As a third example, unless all caps are infinite, B = I and C = 0 is not feasible.
• Let Ω(X, γ, d, c, s) be the element-wise maximum over all (B, C) ∈ K of the matrices (I − C)γBX(I − C). Notice that (I − C) performs the same function as the Ψ map here;
however, it maintains zero rows and columns, making the result comparable across different (B, C) pairs. Notice that
We will use this tilde notation to simplify the algebra. To distinguish between tilde notation from different Ψ(C), we will use different subscript notations. E.g., For (B 1 , C 1 ) ∈ K, The idea behind this condition is that not all (B, C) pairs are feasible-in particular, if some caps are finite, we will never have to work with all of γX at once-and so we only need to consider the worst cases of the feasible pairs to construct a dominating linear map.
Proof. Lemma 1 gives us that a linear system with matrix Ω is a contraction with respect to some weighted Euclidean norm. Let · s be such a norm and let α ∈ [0, 1) be the corresponding Lipschitz constant. Since our matrices are non-negative, the Perron-Frobenius theorem gives us
Note that the derivatives of B( ) and C( ) are zero except at points of discontinuity. On the subsets of the domain space on which (B, C) is constant ((B, C)-constant sets), Φ is a linear system described by (I − C)γBX(I − C). This can be written as
where the third line follows because 0 ≤ Ψ TγBX Ψ ≤ Ω element-wise. Thus Φ is a contraction with respect to · s locally on each (B, C)-constant set.
Note that forˆ on the boundary of a (B 1 , C 1 )-constant set and a (B 2 , C 2 )-constant set,
since Φ is continuous. The explanation for this is that, on the boundary, multiple Bs and Cs could be defined equivalently. Φ is an intersection of linear systems on the boundaries. The difference in possible Bs comes from edges that have exactly met their deductible but have no excess liability.
The difference in possible Cs comes from edges that have exactly met their cap. In these cases, B ii (respectively C ii ) can be set equivalently to 1 or 0. Hence, the contraction relation extends to the boundaries of B-constant sets.
We next show that the contraction relation extends to the union of two adjacent (B, C)-constant sets. Choose 1 ∈ (B 1 , C 1 )-constant set and 2 ∈ (B 2 , C 2 )-constant set such the shortest path only crosses one (B, C)-constant boundary. Since · s is a weighted Euclidean norm, there is a shortest path between 1 and 2 that crosses the boundary between (B 1 , C 1 )-and (B 2 , C 2 )-constant sets.
Letˆ be the crossing point of this boundary. Then
where the second line follows since either (B 1 , C 1 ) or (B 2 , C 2 ) can be used in Φ along the boundary, the third line follows from the triangle inequality, the fifth line follows from the contraction relation on (B, C)-constant sets and their boundaries, and the sixth line follows sinceˆ is on the shortest path from 1 to 2 .
Next, consider the shortest path (a line) between any two points in the space { | ≥ 0}. As established by Lemma 2, the (B, C)-constant sets are convex, which means that a line cannot cross the boundary of any (B, C)-constant set more than twice. Thus, the shortest path between the points can only cross finitely many boundaries (at most 2 · 2 2 m , or two for each possible (B, C)-constant set). Then, by induction on the number of (B, C)-constant sets along the shortest path, the contraction relation of Φ extends to the union of all (B, C)-constant sets, which is equivalently the whole space { | ≥ 0} by Lemma 2.
We now need to show that solutions are restricted to a compact set. Since ρ(Ω) < 1, we can derive an upper bound for the solution by solving the dominating linear system Ω (which may or may not come from a feasible (B, C) ∈ K), taking the maximum coordinate, and forming the hypercube in which coordinates are bounded by 0 and this maximum coordinate. The Banach fixed point theorem then gives the result.
The following corollary describes a more intuitive condition on the spectral radius of the 'full' graph γX. However, this simpler condition does not cover general layering structure. In particular, column sums are restricted to ≤ 1. Notice that the only condition of the collorary is that ρ(γX) < 1, which further means that any such system leads to a unique fixed point for every possible shock. Corollary 1. Given a financial system (X, γ, d, c, s), if the spectral radius ρ(γX) < 1, there is a unique fixed point to Φ.
In the case of all infinite caps (i.e., effectively no caps), Corollary 1 gives a result similar to Theorems 1 and 2 in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] . We note that our proof is more direct and general. The more general condition on the spectral radius of γX enables the more powerful Banach fixed point theorem to prove the result directly. This method can apply to a broader set of problems, whereas the proof in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] requires minutiae of the specific contagion mechanism and the relations between different firms to arrive at the result.
The general case of Corollary 1 is similar to Proposition 1 in [Acemoglu et al. 2015] , which considers clearing vectors in a liabilities network with external senior debt. However, the theorem in [Acemoglu et al. 2015] only applies to matrices of connectivity with all entries strictly positive since the proof relies on the positive version of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. To handle non-negative matrices, we need to require the spectral radius be < 1 since eigenvalues can otherwise be 1.
Theorem 1 and the results we derive in the following sections venture well beyond the setting and results in [Acemoglu et al. 2015 ] to describe fixed points that apply for the full range of layering structure that can be seen in reinsurance networks. In particular, we need to allow column sums of γX to be > 1 since there can be multiple complete layers of reinsurance.
A natural question is whether we can strengthen Theorem 1 by showing uniqueness for a yet wider setting. Conditioning on ρ(ΨγBXΨ T ) < 1 for all (B, C) pairs that partition the domain into nonempty (B, C)-constant sets (and recalling that C defines Ψ), Φ is everywhere a local contraction-i.e., Φ is a contraction restricted to each (B, C)-constant set by some metric. We can further show that Φ is globally nonexpansive. We conjecture that, under these conditions, Φ has a unique fixed point.
However, this problem is more challenging because we need to establish a metric over which the function is globally contractive in order to use the existing machinery. We leave this as further work.
Other cases: unique, multiple, and no fixed points
Problematic graph structure can cause Φ to be non-contractive. This occurs when circular sequences of contracts allow 100% reinsurance to be continually recirculated through a given set of nodes.
We will refer to an instance of this as a '100% cycle'. Cycle here refers to the graph theoretic meaning as opposed to the economic meaning. Figure 3 provides three examples of how this can happen. Figure 3a is the simplest example that directly recirculates 100% reinsurance around one cycle. Figure 3b shows that multiple cycles can interact to recirculate 100% reinsurance to a central node. Figure 3c shows that in the most extreme case of a complete graph with all Γ = 1/(n − 1), 100% reinsurance can be recirculated to every node in the network: as all weights are 1/2, the reinsurance that can be recirculated to each node can be a geometric sequence that converges to 1.
100% cycles: no caps case
For simplicity, we first describe the effects of these 100% cycles from the perspective of a system with infinite/no caps, in which γX mostly describes the entire system. Analytically, these 100% cycles cause the matrix powers (γX) k to fail to converge to 0 as k → ∞ since we enter an infinite increasing loop. On the other hand, the condition on the spectral radius < 1 from Corollary 1 ensures that lim k→∞ (γX) k = 0. Checking the spectral radius is a simple check of whether a 100% cycle exists; however, it may be difficult to identify the actual cycle in the If ρ(γX) ≥ 1, there may still be a unique fixed point. If not, there may be a smallest fixed point or there may be no fixed point. The following are some characterizations of these cases.
• As noted in the previous section, the factor of B in γBX serves to remove edges from the resulting weighted graph. Since the spectral radius of a proper subgraph is less than the spectral radius of the initial connected graph, we may have local contraction on some Bconstant sets, but not on the whole domain. Depending how far the shock s spreads, there may still be a unique fixed point on the contractive B-constant sets. In this case, problematic graph structure that causes the spectral radius to be ≥ 1 may not be activated and so won't cause a problem. In other words, we can restrict the domain to the contractive region to find a unique fixed point. Notably, such a system will not yield a fixed point for all possible shocks.
• When 100% cycles are activated by shocks, the system is non-contractive. In this case, there is no fixed point, and some nominal liabilities will increase to infinity as contracts call circularly in 100% cycles.
• If 100% cycles have their deductibles exactly met from outside claims but are otherwise unactivated, we can have multiple solutions. A simple example of this is a 100% cycle with zero deductibles and zero outside claims. In this case, any value on these contracts is selffulfilling, and so there are infinitely many fixed points. Notice that each 100% cycle is selfcontained due to the assumption that no firm can reinsure over 100%. This means that the self-fulfilling solutions in each such cycle are independent. Then the set of fixed points looks like a Cartesian product of individual solution subsets related to the 100% cycles in the network that have deductibles exactly met by outside claims.
100% cycles: general caps case
Corollary 1 tells us cases in which we can prove unique fixed points for all shocks. Theorem 1 covers more cases. Outside of these theorems, there may still be unique fixed points in other systems: in some cases if the shocks don't activate problematic network structure, and in other cases there may be no problematic network structure to worry about. Additionally, even if 100% cycles are activated, finite contract caps can limit the non-contractive effect to particular layers that reach capacity. In this case, the finite caps remove the problematic graph structure from the remainder of the problem. When we aren't guaranteed uniqueness, we can see similar effects as in the no caps case of multiple fixed points or no fixed points. In the case of multiple fixed points, the solutions can be restricted to self-reinforcing liabilities within particular layers of reinsurance.
As we will see in the following subsections, in the case of multiple fixed points, there is always a least fixed point that represents the real world solution. The other fixed points are mathematical artifacts from self-reinforcing liabilities that do not stem from propagation of primary insurance claims.
Least fixed points
In the event that we have multiple solutions, there is a least fixed point as the others are self-fulfilling and not caused by actual claims. This is formalized in the following theorem.
there is a least fixed point. Further, a fixed point iteration starting from 0 converges to this minimum fixed point.
Note that the Tarski fixed point theorem cannot be used in this setting because the domain lattice is not necessarily bounded above. Instead, our proof relies on the Kleene fixed point theorem. The Kleene fixed point theorem is additionally constructive, and so guarantees that fixed point iteration converges to the least fixed point if it exists. We will first introduce the machinery behind this theorem following the exposition from [Baranga 1991 ] and then use it to prove Theorem 2.
Let (P, ≤) be a partially ordered set, meaning the binary relation ≤ is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
• (P, ≤) is ω-complete if every increasing (i.e., nondecreasing) sequence {x n } n∈N in P has supremum in P .
• A function f : P → P is ω-continuous if it preserves supremums of increasing sequences. I.e., for every increasing sequence {x n } n∈N in P that has supremum in P , the sequence {f (x n )} n∈N also has supremum in P and
Notice that a ω-continuous function is monotone increasing. This is a direct consequence of preserving suprema of all increasing sequences.
Theorem 3. (Kleene fixed point theorem) Let (P, ≤) be a ω-complete partially ordered set and f : P → P be a ω-continuous function. If there is x ∈ P such that x ≤ f (x), then x = sup{f n (x)|n ∈ N} is the least fixed point of f in {y ∈ P |y ≥ x}.
LetR be the completion of the real numbers with ∞. We will work in this extended space and draw our results back to the normal real space. We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof. First notice ({ ∈R m | ≥ 0}, ≤) is a ω-complete partial ordering. Choose x = 0 and note that 0 ≤ Φ(0). Notice that we are working in an extension of R m , and so we may find that the fixed point promised by the theorem is infinite. To address this, we have assumed that there is a (finite) fixed point on R m , and so the minimum fixed point must also be finite. It now remains to be shown that Φ is ω-continuous.
Take two sequences x n ↑x and y n ↑x in the partial ordering. We need to establish that lim n→∞ Φ(x n ) = lim n→∞ Φ(y n ). This result is immediate if all coordinates ofx are finite since Φ is continuous and monotone increasing. So suppose some coordinates ofx are infinite. As we go along the process Φ(x n ), a finite number of edges and caps can be activated, after which activations stop. Thus there is a step N after which Φ will be a linear map on the remaining x n s. The same is true for some step M for the sequence of y n s. Then for n ≥ max(M, N ), the Φ(x n ) and Φ(y n ) will lie on an increasing hyperplane, with Φ(x n ) = Ψ TγB (XΨx n +ṽ) + Cc and Φ(y n ) = Ψ TγB (XΨy n +ṽ) + Cc, for some B, C, Ψ(C). Since x n ≥ 0 we then have
The last equality holds sincex is the supremum of x n and thus lies on the same extended hyperplane.
The same equality holds for the y n sequence.
Now define Φ(x) := lim n→∞ Φ(x n ) for any sequence x n ↑x. By the above, this is well-defined because the value is independent of the sequence chosen. Thus Φ is ω-continuous. Then the Kleene fixed point theorem gives the results.
The next theorem gives us a conditions under which we can apply the Tarski fixed point theorem, in which case we know outright that a least (and greatest) fixed point exists.
Theorem 4. Let (X, γ, d, c, s) be a financial system. Let Ψ 0 map to a system on the edges with infinite caps (or map to the zero matrix if all caps are finite). Then if the spectral radius ρ(Ψ 0 γXΨ T 0 ) < 1, Φ has least and greatest fixed points.
Proof. Because Φ is the composition of an increasing affine map, an element-wise maximum with 0, and an element-wise minimum with c > 0, Φ is non-negative and monotone increasing.
We now show that we can restrict the domain of Φ to a complete lattice containing all fixed points.
In the worst case, all finite caps are met, leaving us with the system Ψ 0 γXΨ T 0 . Since this has spectral radius < 1, this subsystem has a unique fixed point max by the result in the previous section. Thus, in the worst case, this is the maximum fixed point of Φ. Note that this is dependent on the shock s, but such a point exists for each s. Let y be the maximum element of p and form the complete lattice [0, y] ⊂ R m bounded in each coordinate by 0 and y.
Restrict the domain of Φ to [0, y] . Then the Tarski fixed point theorem gives us the existence of least and greatest fixed points. We have provided a wide variety of cases for which we are guaranteed least fixed points. In the next subsection, we show that the least fixed point is the real world solution of interest.
Multiple fixed points: net liabilities equal
Recall that L is the equilibrium firm-to-firm liabilities matrix. Rows represent liabilities from the row firm to each column firm. Define the net liabilities of each firm as a vector 
I.e., the net liabilities of each firm are equivalent under any fixed point.
We will need the following two lemmas to prove the theorem.
where
This is because the amount that reinsurers reimburse i is dependent on the liabilities that i directly
is limited to 100%. When a contract deductible is reached, the negative slope lessens. When a contract cap is reached, the negative slope steepens. However, the 100% reinsurance limit means that the slope is never greater than zero.
This result is immediate because the reinsurance system doesn't amplify losses-it only distributes losses across the network. As the initial shock isn't included in L, the terms in L sum to 0.
We now prove Theorem 5. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 in [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] .
However, by Lemma 4, we know that
Thus there can be no such i.
Because net liabilities are equivalent between fixed points, the least fixed point corresponds to the real world solution. It represents the propagation of primary insurance shocks, whereas other fixed points add self-fulfilling liabilities on top of this.
We have widely characterized least fixed points of Φ. In the next section, we provide efficient algorithms for finding these fixed points.
Algorithms to find the least fixed point
To find the minimum fixed point, if it exists, we can perform a fixed point iteration of Φ starting at 0. Algorithm 1 performs this fixed point iteration. The constructive statement of the Kleene fixed point theorem guarantees that Algorithm 1 converges to the minimum fixed point, if it exists.
In practice, this runs efficiently. However, in the worst case, it can take arbitrarily long. To see this, consider an arbitrarily small damping of the near-100% cycle from Figure 5 with infinite caps.
The fixed point iteration operates by pushing mass iteratively around the system starting at the primary liabilities. As a given edge's liabilities increase in one iteration, it's tail node makes further calls on its reinsurers in the next iteration, increasing the liabilities on their edges. The number of fixed point iterations goes to infinity as the damping goes to 0. This is because all excess loss will end up with the damping node, but we require arbitrarily many trips through the cycle to reach equilibrium since the mass removed from the recirculation in each iteration is smaller with a smaller damping.
Algorithm 1 Fixed point iteration algorithm to determine reinsurance network liabilities Input:d, c, γ, s, X Let 0 be the zero vector, t ← 1, finish ← False while finish = False do Let b t indicate the entries that satisfy Proof. We first show that, at each step, the system (I − γBX) is nonsingular. We are given ρ(γX) < 1. Then, as noted in the proof to Theorem 1, the spectral radii obey ρ(γBX) ≤ ρ(γX) < 1 for any diagonal B with 1-0 entries since B only serves to remove edges from the initial line graph.
Then the Neumann series gives us that (I − γBX) is invertible at each step in the algorithm.
The algorithm converges to the correct solution by a simple monotonicity argument. At each step, we have B t ≤B, whereB is the true set of edge activations, since we start with all edges unactivated and edges that become activated are direct propagations of the claims on primary insurers. The sequence of B t is monotonically increasing in entries since the activation of edges can only increase the number of other edges that become activated. B t can update at most m times as that is how many edges can become activated. Eventually, we reach a state that represents the correct edge activations, after which the contagion spreads to no further edges, and the edge liabilities are the solution to the resulting linear system. This equilibrium point is the unique fixed point since solving the linear system and checking that B does not change is equivalent to verifying a fixed point of Φ. As each step requires solving a linear system (requiring in general O(m 2 ) time), and there are at most m steps, the total running time is at most O(m 3 ).
Note that Algorithm 2 works in some additional cases (still assuming infinite caps). In the first case, we may have problematic graph structure as demonstrated in the previous section, but which is not in a region of the graph that is activated by the given shock. This means that the algorithm never leaves the contractive region of Φ. In the second case, (I − γBX) can be invertible even if ρ(γBX) ≥ 1. Note that in this latter case, (I − γBX) −1 will not be nonnegative, but this is not an issue as = (I − γBX) −1 γB(s − d) will still be nonnegative as required.
Iterative linear solver: caps case
We now adapt the iterative linear solver to the setting with contract caps. However, this is complicated by the fact that an iteration from 0 could mistakenly activate edges due to overcapacity leakage along edges in one of the linear solves. To avoid this, we need to start from the worst case and iterate downward, which results in a process that terminates at the maximum fixed point.
Thus, this process only converges to the least fixed point if there is a unique fixed point.
The linear systems that come up in iterations are of the form˜ =γB(X˜ +ṽ) (recall that tilde notation incorporates the Ψ transformation onto the subsystem of edges that are not overcapacity in the previous iteration), which has a unique solutioñ
Algorithm 3 describes the iterative linear solver. be the matrix element-wise maximum, and Ψ 0 be the map to a system on the edges with infinite caps (or map to the zero matrix if all caps are finite). Then if ρ(Ω) < 1 and ρ(Ψ 0 γXΨ T 0 ) < 1, Algorithm 3 converges to the solution in at most O(m 3 ) time.
Proof. As before, we first show that, at each step, the system (I −γBX) is nonsingular. We are given ρ(Ω) < 1. Then, as noted in the proof to Theorem 1, the spectral radii obey ρ(γBX) ≤ ρ(Ω) < 1, for any (B, C) ∈ K and Ψ(C) sinceγBX is effectively a subgraph of Ω after removing edges under B and nodes under Ψ.
We are given ρ(ΨγXΨ) < 1. This applies to the first iteration of the algorithm. All subsequent iterations involve (C, B) ∈ K. In particular, the last iterative value at that point in the algorithm is feasible for the given (C, B) . Thus at each iteration, we have ρ(γBX) < 1. Then the Neumann series gives us that (I −γBX) is invertible at each step in the algorithm.
The algorithm converges to the correct solution by a monotonicity argument as in Proposition 1.
However, the setup here is more nuanced. If the iteration had started at 0 in this setting, we would lose the property that B t ≤B and C t ≤Ĉ, whereB andĈ are the true edge activations and cap activations, as some edge activations could cause the linear solver to attribute more liability to some edges than are allowed by their capacities. While the overcapacity would be corrected in the following iteration, the overcapacity leakage could have caused new activations in B t that cannot be corrected by the next iteration.
Instead of starting at 0, we start at an upper bound to the solution. Such an upper bound is constructed by assuming all edges are activated (B = I) and all finite caps are activated and solving the linear system, which has a unique solution since as shown above. Now we will have B t ≥B and C t ≥Ĉ at each step since we start with an element-wise overestimate in B and C and any caps or edges that become deactivated through this process will have been unsupported given the overestimate. In this event, either we correct an element in C downward or correct the same elements in both B and C downward. Thus the sequences of B t and C t are also monotonically decreasing. Note that we would never want to revise these corrections back upward in a later iteration as these edges or caps will never be activated by liabilities that are lower element-wise than we have already tried in the previous round.
In the equilibrium, all edge and cap activations will be supported by the equilibrium liability values. Eventually, we reach a state that represents the correct edge and cap activations, and the edge liabilities are the solution to the resulting linear system. This equilibrium point is the unique fixed point since solving the linear system and checking that B and C do not change is equivalent to verifying a fixed point of Φ.
At each step, either B or C changes or we stop our iteration. Thus there are at most 2m steps as there are at most 2m possible changes to B and C. The most complex task at each step is again solving a linear system, which requires in general O(m 2 ) time. Note that the Ψ transformations are sparse and can be computed in at most O(m 2 ). Thus the algorithm converges in at most O(m 3 ) time.
Note that the conditions of the proposition may be difficult to check in general. An easier condition to check is that ρ(γX) < 1; however, this is again not general enough to include many real world cases of multiple layers of XL contracts. This algorithm additionally 'works' when ρ(γBX) < 1 for all (B, C) pairs. However, we only know that it terminates at the minimum fixed point (i.e., a unique fixed point) when ρ(Ω) < 1.
Real World Implications of the Network Model
In the previous sections, we developed the machinery of our reinsurance network model. This model works sequentially by calculating liabilities given a shock, applying the collateralized portion of reinsurance contracts to cover liabilities, and then calculating clearing payments in the network.
We now turn our attention to practical implications of this model and our results.
Multiple fixed points: fraud and governance
In certain cases, multiple fixed points can exist for liabilities and for clearing payments in the network. In the previous sections, we introduced the cases of multiple fixed points for liabilities in our model. We introduce a new real world mechanism below that can cause additional multiplicity of liabilities solutions. Given liabilities, multiple fixed points for determining clearing payments can also exist when costs of default are nonzero [Rogers and Veraart 2013] . This is realistically the case as there are legal, transactional, and liquidity costs associated with real world defaults.
In our formal model, the case of multiple fixed points for liabilities is a case of a more general fraud problem. This is because the minimum fixed point is the correct solution in these cases. Other fixed points are mathematical artifacts; differences from the minimum fixed point are self-fulfilling and not the result of actual primary insurance claims. The only reason we would find ourselves in a non-minimum fixed point is from fraud in the system. In this case, someone has arbitrarily inflated their liabilities, and the network makes these inflated liabilities self-fulfilling. For example, in Figure 3b , assume the deductibles of the blue nodes in the 100% cycle have been exactly met.
Then, in the minimum fixed point, the liability on each blue node is 0. However, if one blue node presents fraudulent higher claims, the 100% cycle self-fulfills this into another fixed point.
In the real world outside of our formal model, however, multiple solutions for liabilities can pose a network governance issue. This is because the parameters of many reinsurance contracts aren't even known by the parties of the contract. It's a common practice in the reinsurance industry to agree to 'in the future agree on a specific contract'. 2 In extreme cases, these 'contracts' have been litigated to determine what contract would have been reasonably agreed upon. In this case, the global contract parameters aren't in principle knowable, as assumed in our model, and there are additional potential solutions for the different potential versions of the unknown contract.
If there is disagreement in the payouts of reinsurance contracts, such as from multiple potential solutions, the issue goes to a panel of arbitors to resolve [Schiffer 2006 ]. The members of the panel are typically active or former executive officers of insurance or reinsurance companies [Schiffer 2006 ] and will have different incentives. For example, these could include the following: driving a competitor out of the market, limiting contagion to given markets, or pinning default on parties that are least connected to themselves. Even when the arbitors do not have direct conflicts of interest, indirect conflicts of interest are unavoidable through network structure. The arbitors will have different perceived risk exposure to the various solutions. These incentives are outside of the focus of this study; our purpose is to illustrate that cases like this can happen. We leave it to future work to model these incentives and design good governance structures to account for these.
Multiple fixed points for clearing payments poses a similar network governance problem.
A new incentive to cooperate on fraud prevention
To fully protect against fraud, a system needs to allow all parties to verify that upstream liabilities are valid direct propagations of primary insurance claims. Ordinarily, firms only have access to audit the direct claims they receive, which means they must trust all other firms in the network to have properly audited the claims they received and that no firms collude in this regard. In the current industry setup, there is usually no good way to detect fraud. Instead, there is a sense that reinsurers only work with insurers that they trust to some degree. Aside from the potential for outright fraud, there are commonly grey instances in which a reinsurance firm will typically pay out a little more than required by a contract if the insurer is a 'good customer'. 3 This grey inflation of claims can affect claims down the chain of reinsurers.
As we will see theoretically in the next subsection and demonstrate empirically in the simulation section, even very small perturbations to the system can cause wild differences in how loss is distributed in the network. Thus even very small fraud can have outsized effects on the equilibrium of the reinsurance market. Further, a fraudulent ordering of payments could also affect the equilibrium after taking into account clearing. There can be wild variability in the valid claims a firm could reasonably face given a shock-some with catastrophic consequences for the firm. Thus each firm should be highly suspect of whether the network of claims is correct, especially if they face high losses under the proposed claims. Even if fraud is very unlikely and only very small, a firm's potential benefit from exposing it could be quite large (e.g., the difference of the firm defaulting or not). Thus our sensitivity results form the basis for a very strong-and to our knowledge, previously undiscussed-incentive for a large majority of firms to band together to combat fraud, and potentially share information with each other in order to do so. This could be done through a trusted central party or through a distributed ledger, such as a blockchain, that records audited and time-ordered claims and reinsurance payments. In the real world, the difficulty in designing such a system is to find an acceptable sharing of information that allows participants in the network to independently verify the equilibrium liabilities and clearing state in the network. In practice, this is difficult as firms consider their contract information
proprietary. However, the incentive to participate as a group in such a system based on our sensitivity results will weigh in to find a balance between transparency and privacy, which may allow security guarantees on fraud.
Reinsurance spirals: evaluating tail risk of positions
Relaxations of 100% cycles can cause counterintuitive nonlinear behavior known as reinsurance spirals. By relaxation, we mean that the cycle circulates close to (but ≤) 100% reinsurance. We will refer to this as 'relaxed cycles'. This is introduced, for instance, in [Bain 1999 ] with an example in the Lloyd's and London reinsurance markets in the 1980s. In these spirals, nominal liabilities increase at each step through the graph cycle until one of the contract edges reaches its cap, after which all excess liability is left with the reinsured party of that contract. Figure 4 provides an example of a graph structure prone to spirals. In this example, even though the size of the shock is less than all contract caps, the spiral effect causes the cap on (C, A) to be reached, leaving all liability for the shock on A. Even though, given first order information, all parties think they are adequately reinsured, it turns out that this is not the case. Relaxation of the 100% cycle to smaller values of γ lessen the growth of liabilities in the cycle, but lead to a similar effect, where a disproportionate amount of excess liability is left with a single party. Further, the effect is the same, even if we arbitrarily scale the caps around the cycle. I.e., even if caps are very high, in which case a firm would intuitively expect to be very well reinsured, firms are still subject to the exact same spiral risk.
Another type of spiral that can happen is when a relaxed cycle is damped by a node outside the cycle. See Figure 5 for an example. In this case, in each trip through the cycle, a small proportion of excess liability is siphoned off by the damping reinsurer. The remaining proportion continues around the cycle until a proportion of it is again siphoned off by the damper. In equilibrium, a disproportionate amount of the excess loss can be left on the damping reinsurer, depending on the cap parameters in the cycle. This said, the damping reinsurer may not be aware of the role they are taking in the network; given their local first-degree information, they may think they're only reinsuring one firm instead of the whole cycle. If there are multiple damping reinsurers, as in Figure 6 , it will be difficult to predict whether one of the dampers (and which one) will be left with disproportionate excess liability if there is imperfect information about network parameters. For instance, one damping contract could have a low cap, leaving most liability on the second damping contract. Alternatively, a contract cap within the cycle could be activated and leave most excess loss on one of the reinsurers in the cycle. These damped spirals can be more extreme, aggregating losses from multiple sources. Figure 7 is an example where losses from multiple primary insurers are aggregated through the relaxed cycle, leaving all excess liability with the damping reinsurer. Counterintuitive behavior from reinsurance spirals can get more extreme. A node can be arbitrarily far from a relaxed cycle in a connected graph but still be left with disproportionate excess loss. Figure 8 gives an example of a damping chain of reinsurers. Under some parameter sets, the majority of excess loss can be left on the node at the end of the chain, even though it is three steps removed from the graph cycle.
In another example of counterintuitive behavior, a contract cap, which is meant to protect a reinsurer against losses that are higher than anticipated, can actually cause greater loss to the firm it was meant to protect. Figure 9 gives an example where this can happen. If edge (C, B) has a cap that is reached, it can cause B to default. B's default can in turn cause A to default, which can make C worse off because A can no longer reimburse C for some losses from D. If there are default costs, the loss of reinsurance payments from A to C to cover claims from D can outweigh the additional reinsurance payments C would have paid to B.
In terms of liabilities alone, a contract cap doesn't necessarily limit the liability of a node caused by another node. Figure 10 gives an example where graph connections through a second layer of reinsurance counteract the contract cap on the first layer. In this case, B reinsures A up to the cap, after which additional excess loss is translated back to B through a second layer of reinsurance from C. Of course, deductibles may reduce the total loss borne by B. In a real application, B likely knows little of the network structure outside of first degree connections and so may be unaware that it is also liable for parts of the second layer of reinsurance coverage of A.
We conjecture that, all else equal, a lower cap on a reinsurance contract that a firm provides only makes the firm better off or equivalently well off in terms of net liabilities before clearing. Note that the network does not amplify the shock in the system in terms of net liabilities but rather distributes the shock across the system-i.e., in the end, the total net liabilities will equal the total initial shock. However, as the example in Figure 9 shows, after clearing with default costs, firms could be worse off because of lower caps.
Relaxed cycles aren't the only graph structures that can concentrate losses in the network. A tree structure such as in Figure 11 can aggregate losses from many primary reinsurers onto one reinsurer (the root node). Currently, reinsurers can control for this tree aggregation risk by putting limits on the size of the reinsurered portfolios (usually in terms of premiums the reinsured firm receives). Figure 11 : A tree structure that aggregates many losses on one reinsurer. This risk management method does not work in the case of relaxed cycles, however. Even if firms in a relaxed cycle individually have small reinsurance portfolios, the relaxed cycle can include a large number of firms and the spiraling behavior can aggregate losses from all of these portfolios.
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In the tree case, the reinsured portfolios would have to be large to lead to large aggregations of losses.
We have demonstrated the emergence of reinsurance spirals and the extreme bearing of reinsurance losses due to network structure using simple examples. While these examples are illustrative, more complicated examples, as in real world reinsurance networks, can exhibit the same effects.
Importantly, in the real world, we have high uncertainty about the network structure and contract parameters. In the extreme, we have previously mentioned that the parameters of some real industry contracts are not even agreed upon beforehand. Instead, the 'contract' is really just an agreement to in the future agree on a contract, and so the parties of the contract don't even know the actual terms of the contract. As a result of this uncertainty, we also have high uncertainty about which problematic structures emerge. For example, it is difficult to determine if, by taking a given contract position, a firm exposes itself to being a damping node. Small groups of firms have incomplete information about the global network structure. They face intrinsic uncertainty of global contract parameters and, therefore, their extreme bearing of reinsurance losses. 4 Finally, it is important to note that even small perturbations in the network parameters can lead to large differences in losses and where extreme losses are borne. To illustrate this, consider again the example in Figure 4 . Small changes to the contract caps (e.g., switching which contract has a cap of 10 vs. 11) affect which edge cap is met and, in turn, who bears all excess loss. In the real world, uncertainty around network parameters is likely to be non-small, which only exacerbates the problem. We demonstrate this high sensitivity to parameters using real network data in the next section.
We briefly discuss contract designs that can mitigate reinsurance spirals and parameter sensitivity in the following remark.
Remark 1. From a global contract design perspective, there are a few things that can help mitigate spirals and parameter sensitivity. However, these aren't guaranteed to be effective.
• Contract deductibles help to lower the excess loss that is reciruclated through graph cycles by absorbing some loss before each edge activation. However, given a large shock, deductibles may not be enough to prevent disproportionate network effects from spirals, as was the case during the Lloyd's and London reinsurance market spiral during the 1980s.
• The cap-deductible layering structure of XL reinsurance obfuscates risks and heightens sensitivity to parameters by adding lots of nonlinearities into the network. On top of this, we have to clear the network liabilities given the available equity, which adds additional nonlinearities.
On the other hand, a system composed of proportional reinsurance contracts is much simpler to compute as liabilities can be calculated through a linear system. This removes many of the nonlinearities (but not all as we still need to clear the network), which helps make the risk faced by a firm in the network clearer. This lessens the chances that firms think they are adequately reinsured but later find out otherwise. This may also lead to less parameter sensitivity since, as pointed out in a previous section, the liabilities of a proportional system are determined by solving a single linear system. On an aggregate level, this may also lower systemic risk, which we examine using real network data in the next section.
Simulations with Real Network Data
In this section, we investigate two questions posed in the previous section using simulations on real reinsurance network data:
• Is there high parameter sensitivity in real reinsurance networks? I.e., is it difficult to estimate the risk faced by a firm in the network from a particular shock? We demonstrated that this is a theoretical issue in the previous section.
• Are XL or proportional contract systems better from a systemic perspective? In the previous section, we demonstrated that a system based on XL contracts adds many nonlinearities to the system, which can serve to obfuscate risk and concentrate losses. A proportional system, on the other hand, has much less nonlinearities.
Our code is available at www.github.com/aklamun/reinsurance_networks. The rules of thumb and data-based parameters we discuss below are coded as default parameter values to financial system construction; however, the user can easily adjust these assumptions when calling the code functions.
Network construction
As the basis for our simulations, we use real network data on property and casualty reinsurance from 2012 Schedule F Part 3, as obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners [NAIC 2018] . This data details premiums ceded to reinsurers by US insurance companies. Naturally, this data doesn't provide all contract parameters, so we estimate these using common rules of thumb in the insurance industry, which we back up with data where available.
XL contract parameters
We construct networks of XL contracts consistent with the NAIC data by estimating the coverage provided by each firm's reinsurance contracts and separating its reinsurers into two layers. We introduce the following 'in-the-ballpark' example of a reinsurance contract. 5 Example 1. ('Ballpark' Reinsurance Contract) Suppose $500M is the 1-in-100 year loss for a firm.
As an 'in-the-ballpark' figure, this firm would purchase reinsurance coverage of $500M in losses with a deductible of $100M. The $400M total coverage limit would be separated equally into 2-3 layers.
The total premiums ceded for this coverage would be 10% of the $400M limit. The lower layers would receive closer to 20% of their respective limits, while the higher layer would receive closer to 2-3% of its respective limit.
This example suggests the following rules of thumb that we use to fill in parameters in our real world network:
• premiums ceded ≈ 0.1 · coverage limit,
• coverage ≈ 5 · deductible, where coverage = coverage limit + deductible,
• top layer premiums ≈ 0.2 · total premiums ceded.
The only publicly available reinsurance contract data that we are aware of comes from major state catastrophe funds-for instance, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association. We compiled data on these reinsurance contracts, which is available in our code repository. This data supports that the first rule of thumb is reasonable.
Given a separation of a firm's reinsurers into layers, these rules of thumb allow us to estimate each contract's deductible and cap. We then estimate each contract's proportion of the layer as γ = premiums ceded/total premiums ceded for layer.
Note that the coverage limits discussed above, which represent the cap payout from the whole reinsurance tower, are different from individual contract caps, which dictate the maximum payout from each contract that is itself only a part of the whole tower.
To separate a firm's reinsurers into two layers, we use the last rule of thumb to note that the premiums from the bottom layer should add to 80% of total premiums and the premiums from the top layer should comprise the remaining 20%. This is a knapsack problem that we can efficiently solve approximately. Figure 12 gives a visualization of the resulting XL network with edges weighted by γ. The figure shows a core-periphery structure. The core is composed of a central group of reinsurers and primary insurers who reinsure through most of them. This core-periphery structure is common in a variety of financial networks, see e.g. [Craig and Von Peter 2014] .
Proportional contract parameters
We construct networks of proportional contracts consistent with the NAIC data by setting all contract deductibles to 0, all contract caps to ∞, and calculating each contract's coinsurance rate as γ = premium ceded/(primary premiums + foreign reinsurance premiums + reinsurance premiums), where the denominator describes insurance premiums received by the ceding firm in the contract.
In this way, the ceding firm cedes a proportion of their total risk for the same portion of the premiums they've received. We estimate the primary premiums and foreign reinsurance premiums next.
Primary insurance and foreign reinsurance premiums
We additionally need to estimate the insurance premiums received from outside the reinsurance network. If the receiving firm is a primary insurer, this is the primary insurance premiums they receive. If the firm is a reinsurer, this is foreign (outside US) reinsurance premiums.
We then generate figures for these values within an estimated range:
1. We collect data on premiums received and reinsurance premiums ceded from 10-ks and annual reports. Our data is available in our code repository. From this data, we determine reasonable upper and lower bounds on premiums ceded/premiums received for firms.
2. For each firm in the network, we generate a random number uniformly between the upper and lower bounds. This is used as the firm's premiums ceded/premiums received ratio.
3. From this ratio, we calculate the outside premiums-either primary insurance or foreign reinsurance-that the firm must receive to achieve this ratio. If the amount is negative, it is treated as zero.
Based on the data, primary insurers generally have ratios between 0.05 and 0.5, and reinsurers generally have ratios between 0.1 and 0.3. We use these bounds in our simulations.
Firm capital levels
We next need to estimate each firm's capital that is available for paying its liabilities (i.e., the firm's equity). Current capital regulations focus on various factors through Risk-Based Capital; however, past regulations focused on the simpler leverage ratio [Ingram 2016 ]. For simplicity, we use this latter measure as a benchmark in our simulations. The leverage ratio is defined in the following way:
leverage ratio = equity/net written premiums.
According to [The Actuary 2004] , American regulation required minimum 50% leverage ratios.
They also state that 20% leverage ratios was a "rule of thumb" in the German market for property and casualty insurers.
We extend this information by collecting data on equities and net written premiums from 10-ks and annual reports. Our data is available in our code repository. We use this data to determine reasonable upper and lower bounds on current leverage ratios. Based on the data, insurers generally have leverage ratios between 0.7 and 2.0, which we use as bounds in our simulations. We then generate figures for firm leverage ratios within the estimated range:
1. For each firm in the network, we generate a random number uniformly between the upper and lower bounds. This is used as the firm's leverage ratio.
2. From the ratio, we calculate the firm's equity.
Note that following a market collapse, leverage ratios can plummet, which can significantly affect the capital levels in the reinsurance network. This is the reason that Risk-Based Capital is now used for regulation instead of the leverage ratio. For the price of adding greater complexity to our simulations, we could alternatively use Risk-Based Capital measures to estimate equity values instead.
Shocks to primary insurers
The final component of our simulation setup is to calibrate network shocks. These shocks are claims on primary insurers in the network. For our simulations, we consider 1-in-100 year and 1-in-250 year shocks. Industry data on the estimated aggregate size of these shocks is available from [AIR Institute's Certified Catastrophe Modeler Program 2016] . In particular, the North American 1-in-100 year insured loss is estimated at $215.2B, and the North American 1-in-250 year insured loss is estimated at $290.6B. We use these numbers for the aggregate size of tail shocks in our simulations.
The remaining task is to distribute this aggregate shock to primary insurers in the network. We do this in the following way:
1. For each firm, we generate a random number uniformly between 0 and the size of that firm, defined by the total primary premiums received. Under this scheme, the size of a primary insurer correlates with their exposure. Reinsurers' initial exposure is zero as they do not offer primary insurance coverage.
2. We then generate the shock exposure ratios by normalizing these numbers so that they add to 1. Multiplying by the size of the aggregate shock then gives the size of claims to primary insurers under the shock.
In reality, the relation between the size of a primary insurer and its exposure to aggregate shocks is more complex that we model here. On one hand, larger primary insurers may be in a better position to diversify their holdings against geographic risk. On the other hand, their exposures could be higher since their portfolios are larger. In a more realistic model, we would want to account for the geographic exposures of each primary insurer and simulate geographic tail events. However, the data needed for this is not, in general, publicly available.
Sensitivity to parameter perturbations
In our first set of simulations, we examine the firm-level effects of perturbations in the XL financial network parameters. As discussed in the previous section, the nonlinearities added by layering structure make it difficult to evaluate the exposure of a firm to a shock under parameter uncertainty.
Exposures under slightly different parameter sets could be completely different on a theoretical level.
In these simulations, we demonstrate that sensitivity occurs in reasonable estimates of a real world reinsurance network.
In these simulations, we construct an XL network from our data as described in the previous subsections. This is our base case for comparison. In this process, we store the layering structure for future access. Given a multiplicative error term δ (i.e., a percentage error), we then perturb the network parameters as follows:
• For each premium ceded value, we generate a random number uniformly in [1 − δ, 1 + δ] and multiply it with the premium ceded value.
• We then construct the contract parameters using the perturbed premium ceded values as described in the previous subsections using the stored layering structure.
• For each value of a firm's primary insurance premiums received, foreign reinsurance premiums received, and capital levels, we perturb it by a random multiplicative value uniformly chosen
For moderately small values of δ, these perturbations are conservative because firms face a lot of uncertainty about how other firms' contracts are structured and, because of market forces, there are intrinsic uncertainties about each firm's capital available to pay out liabilities at the time of clearing. Additionally, for privately owned insurers, equity values are not publicly available.
With a given shock sh, in each simulation, we calculate a liabilities matrix L and clear the liabilities using methods from [Eisenberg and Noe 2001] . 6 This second step is done without default costs for simplicity and outputs a clearing payment vector p, representing the total payment from each firm, and a default indicator vector. After the simulation, we calculate the vector of end equities e 1 as
where e 0 is the initial equity vector and α is defined component-wise as
where 1 is the all ones vector. The multiplicative equity return is then e 1 /e 0 . A return of 1 represents no loss, 0 represents complete loss of capital, and a negative value means that a primary insurer has outside liabilities that are unable to be covered after clearing. Note that, under this definition, reinsurers face a return floor of zero (i.e., e 1 ≥ 0 since sh = 0 for a reinsurer); this makes sense because they have limited liability. In a legal sense, limited liability could be applied to primary insurers; however, it will be useful to us to explore the uncovered primary losses that are represented using our definition above for equity. Uncovered primary liabilities represent a failure of the system, as the purpose of the insurance-reinsurance industry is to provide protection on physical infrastructure. This does not happen if primary liabilities are not met.
Under a static 1-in-250 year shock, we run simulations with 2.5%, 5%, 10%, and 20% perturbations, each with 50 random samples. We examine how firm equity returns and defaults differ between the perturbed systems and the base system. Figure 13 shows the extent to which these perturbations change firm equity returns. Even under small 2.5% perturbations, a firm's equity return can differ by 100 percentage points. 7 The tail of the distribution fattens quickly as the perturbation magnitude
increases. These results demonstrate that small uncertainties in financial network parameters can lead to wild differences in outputs, as demonstrated with firm equity returns.
By another measure, these perturbations altered the default status of 8 firms (2.5% perturbation) up to 21 firms (20% perturbation). Additionally, these perturbations resulted in significant differences in firm equity levels-not just equity return-on the order of $790M (2.5% perturbation) up to $110B (20% perturbation). This demonstrates that perturbations can affect key players of the market.
An individual firm could be wildly uncertain about the risks they face from a given shock given even small uncertainties about the network.
Systemic effects of contract structures
In our second set of simulations, we examine the systemic effects from different contract structures.
As discussed in the previous section, systems of XL contracts can have the effect of concentrating losses in unpredictable ways. This can cause firms to mistakenly think they are properly reinsured when in effect they are not. On the other hand, a system of proportional contracts can have much less obfuscation of risk. In these simulations, we demonstrate that, given real world network structure, proportional reinsurance systems are more stable in the face of tail risk than comparable XL reinsurance systems. A key word here is of course 'comparable'. The systems we construct are comparable given the structure of the graph on premiums ceded between insurers and our rules of thumb for XL reinsurance contracts. We construct comparable systems using the methods from the previous subsections keeping premiums ceded, firm capital levels, primary insurance premiums, and foreign reinsurance premiums constant. The only differences are in how the ceded premiums are interpreted: as part of a proportional scheme or XL contracts based on our rules of thumb and knapsack separation of layers. Note that this comparison is limited because it's likely that in the real world the equilibrium graph structure, premiums ceded, and firm capital levels would be different between the different settings, whereas we are setting these constant. In the different settings, firms may make different decisions about who to purchase reinsurance from, how much premiums to cede, how much primary insurance to take on, and how much capital to retain. This said, our comparison is still useful because it shows that, given the same aggregate costs in terms of reinsurance premiums ceded and firm capital levels, the reinsurance market could perform systemically better.
We simulate 50 1-in-100 year shocks and 50 1-in-250 year shocks to two comparable XL and proportional reinsurance systems. We compare the aggregate number of defaults, the aggregate uncovered primary claims, and the distribution of firm equity returns for each network in each scenario. Figure 14 compares the number of defaults and the uncovered primary liabilities in each shock scenario. The number of defaults is a common measure of the resilience of financial networks. We argue that the level of uncovered primary liabilities is also a useful comparison because the purpose of the reinsurance industry in the first place is to redistribute risk such that primary insurance liabilities (insurance on real world infrastructure) can be more easily met during shocks. By both measures, the XL system performs consistently worse than the proportional system. Histograms take into account all simulated shocks, each weighted by relative probability of 1-in-100 vs. 1-in-250 year events (60% vs. 40%).
higher tail risk of losses under the XL system than the proportional system. Note that the histogram spikes at 0 are caused by the limited liability of reinsurance companies. As discussed in the previous subsection, we could apply the same limited liability to primary insurers, but find it more useful to represent the uncovered primary liabilities within the distribution. Figure 16 investigates the firm-level effects in more detail. Figure 16a shows the histogram of firm-level differences in returns between the two models, taking into account all scenarios. By this measure, there is a 49.34% chance that a firm will be better off under the proportional model than the XL model. I.e., the additional cost of the proportional structure to the average firm is small.
Consistent with the previous histograms, however, firms are predominantly better off in the tails under the proportional model than the XL model. Figure 16b shows a 2D histogram plotting firm equity return under the proportional model vs. the XL model. The same tail structure can be seen in the 2D histogram. Note that again we can see the limited liability effect of reinsurance companies in the square structure around 0 in the 2D histogram. Reinsurers' returns are constrained to the square between 1 and 0 in the 2D histogram due to the limited liability, whereas the primary insurers' returns form the triangle structure in the 2D histogram.
Concluding Remarks
Current reinsurance risk models don't capture network effects, which we show can be quite extreme.
We have demonstrated that even if firms know the global network structure unreasonably well (i.e., with small uncertainty), they can be wildly uncertain about how losses will be distributed from a given shock. Tail risk from network structure should be taken into account in determining capital requirements, evaluating counterparty risk, and pricing reinsurance contracts. This exposes inherent inefficiencies in the current system. Figure 16 : Firm-level comparison of equity returns in XL system vs. proportional system. Histograms take into account all simulated shocks, each weighted by relative probability of 1-in-100 vs. 1-in-250 year events (60% vs. 40%).
As we mentioned in the section on real world applications, the high equilibrium sensitivity to perturbations demonstrates a strong new incentive for firms to band together to combat fraud, and potentially share information with each other in order to do so. This is because even very small fraud can have an outsized effect on the equilibrium of the network as a whole. We propose that a distributed ledger system, such as a blockchain, could provide guarantees on fraud prevention if it is able to record audited and time-ordered claims and reinsurance payments. We propose future work to design such a system that works given the real world constraints around reinsurance contract privacy. We note, however, that the strong incentive we have demonstrated may make firms more willing to share some data to contribute to fraud prevention, thus relaxing these contraints. Many organizations are making a concerted effort to incorporate blockchain systems into the insurance-reinsurance industry. Our paper helps to inform them about the problems they should be addressing.
In this paper, we have revealed some of the structures and mechanisms that lead to tail risk from network effects. We propose work to develop additional tools that better measure and classify tail risk of positions (e.g., nodes or contracts) within the network. One approach is to use inner Monte Carlo simulations over a range of shocks, and outer Monte Carlo simulations over a range of parameters; however, convergence may be costly. A second approach is to use machine learning classification algorithms. This would entail generating a wide variety of graphs and parameters and evaluating losses from contagion shocks under different scenarios via algorithms from our paper.
Using this as a training set, the aim is to detect graph structures that predict which nodes bear tail risk from spirals. We believe the structure that we have revealed about tail risk in this paper will aid in the construction of such methods. One promising result from our simulations is that, under a given shock, the losses of many network nodes appear robust to parameter error whereas others suffer more chaotic behavior. This suggests that classification algorithms may be successful in predicting which nodes bear high uncertainty and are therefore more susceptible to model error.
Our simulations suggest that, for the same societal-level costs in terms of reinsurance premiums and capital locked in the reinsurance industry, the reinsurance industry can be structured in a different way that performs its social purpose better under extreme events. We would like to extend this to a market design perspective. One issue is that, in isolation, firms can have an incentive to require caps on payouts (although this is not clear-we demonstrated earlier an instance where a firm is worse off from a cap), but at the network level this doesn't appear optimal. We leave it to future work to explore the robust systemic design perspective taking into account how the γ matrix changes with respect to changes in contract structure.
In recent years, catastrophe bonds held by nontraditional players, such as hedge funds, have become more popular in place of traditional reinsurance contracts. One advantage of these is that they could become additional dampers in the system as they absorb losses in the system without recirculating them. This has the tradeoff, however, of more significantly interconnecting the larger financial system, which can cause other potential exposures that are relevant from a market design perspective.
Lastly, stemming from our discussions with industry executives, we propose the following extensions to the model.
• Time dimension: In reality, claims can take a long time to reach reinsurers, often coming in up to several years after the year that they apply to. In the current industry setup, claims are relatively manually reported from one party to the next. This process can take a long time to trickle through chains of reinsurers in the network. Further, some claims don't materialize until future years-e.g., asbestos claims.
• Liquidity factor: Extreme events in the insurance-reinsurance industry-such as high concentration of large losses due to network structure-could trigger a liquidity crisis from fire sales of risky assets. This can amplify losses within and beyond the reinsurance industry,
propagating an insurance-specific event into a systemic crisis.
